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How State Support of Religion Shapes Attitudes Toward Muslim Immigrants: New Evidence From a Sub-National Comparison

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Abstract

This article argues that governments play a considerable role in shaping citizens' attitudes toward Muslim immigrants through the way they regulate religion. European democracies are far from secular, and matters of religious regulation cannot be reduced to abstract values or constitutional clauses. Under conditions of high state support of religion, accommodating new religious minorities involves not only the changing of existing rules but also giving up on long-standing traditions and everyday habits. As a result, citizens see religious newcomers as a threat to their way of life and react with animosity to their practices and demands. We support our argument by combining newly designed survey items with original data on religious regulation in 26 Swiss cantons. Our findings contradict the extant literature and have important implications for the democratic challenges in Europe, the quality of modern immigration societies, and the role of religion in democracy more generally.

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Introduction

"Swiss Ban Building of Minarets on Mosques" was the headline that appeared in the *New York Times* on November 30, 2009. One day earlier, in what could be called the first ever anti-Islam referendum in Europe, a majority of the Swiss population voted in favor of this ban, triggering strong reactions from across the globe (Fetzer & Soper, 2012; Vatter, 2011). About 4 years later, in September 2013, the citizens of the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino decided in yet another referendum to ban the wearing of the burqa in public spaces. It is not without irony that the Swiss case, whose successful accommodation of religious differences was long held as exemplary by the classics of comparative politics (Deutsch, 1976; Lijphart, 1977), now serves as a striking illustration for the new political conflict over Muslim immigration and the accommodation of minority religious practices all over Western Europe. *Why do so many citizens in European democracies fear Muslim immigration, dislike Muslims' religious practices, and oppose their religious rights?* Few questions are more pressing for our understanding of the thorny public policy challenges in Europe, the quality of modern immigrant societies, and the role of religion in democracy more generally.

Looking at political contexts, this article offers a new explanation and argues that governments play a considerable role in shaping citizens' attitudes toward the Muslim minority through the way they regulate religion. By relying on close cooperative relations between the state and the religious majority and by implementing institutions of state support for the dominant religious tradition, governments contribute to a sense of religious–cultural identity among citizens that ultimately shapes attitudes toward Muslims and their religious practices. To see this, it is important to realize that counter to conventional belief European democracies are far from secular (Driessen, 2010; Fox, 2006, 2008) and that matters of state support of religion cannot be reduced to an abstract set of values or constitutional clauses (Fox & Flores, 2009; Gill, 2008). Institutions of state support of religion are not only widespread in Western Europe but also are a significant and tangible element of the public life and collective identities of its citizens. State support of religion comprises a whole array of different regulations and policies ranging from the public identification with religious symbols and traditional customs, over religious education in public schools, to very concrete forms of financial subsidies for religious organizations (Fox, 2008, 2011, 2013; Grim & Finke, 2006).

These institutional settings are important because when the political, social, and cultural life of a public is defined by strong references to religious tradition, religious minorities pose a direct threat to this collective identity. Their practices are not easily accommodated because this would entail a loss in what is essentially perceived a zero-sum game. Under institutional conditions of state support of religion, accommodating new religious minorities involves the changing of existing rules as well as the loss of long-standing traditions, valuable privileges, and maybe even everyday habits. Not only do many citizens prefer the status quo and are uncomfortable with change (Crandall & Eidelman, 2012), they will also see religious newcomers as a threat to their way of life and react with animosity to their practices and demands. In contrast, where governments are more neutral or removed from majority religion and public life is less pervaded by religious tradition, less changes to the institutional status quo are necessary; citizens have only little to lose and are less likely to see religious minorities as threat or competitors. Accordingly, citizens will be more tolerant and accommodating toward the Muslim minority.

We support the predictions of our theory, which contradicts and expands existing arguments in the literature on immigration (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Helbling, 2014; Koopmans, 2013), studies on religious discrimination (Fox & Akbaba, 2013, 2014), and the economics of religion (Grim & Finke, 2007, 2011), by combining two data sources in the controlled setting of a sub-national comparison. First, we draw on newly designed survey items that capture citizens' attitudes toward Muslim immigrants, the wearing of headscarves, and the building of minarets that were for the first time included in the 2011 wave of the *Swiss Electoral Studies* (SELECTS; Lutz, 2012). Second, we make use of another completely new data set that provides indicators of religious regulation for the 26 Swiss cantons and is based on the coding scheme of the international *Religion and the State Project* (RAS) developed by Fox (2008, 2011). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of RAS-type indicators at the sub-national level. Combining these two data sources allows us to study citizens in their political contexts and to relate individual attitudes toward Muslims to a wide range of institutions of state support of religion while holding constant potentially confounding factors—most importantly, the specific context of Muslim immigration.

Our results are based on Bayesian hierarchical-ordered probit models and show that citizens living in political contexts with higher levels of state support of religion are more likely to think that there are too many Muslims in the country and that the building of minarets should be banned. Results for attitudes on Muslim women's right to wear headscarves in public point in a similar direction. Indeed, church–state relations are more important for our

understanding of citizens' attitude toward Muslims than general integration policy or the actual number of Muslims in the canton. These effects stem largely from policies that relate to the upholding of collective identity and are highly visible to ordinary citizens (such as public religious symbols, religious holidays, religious education in public schools, or church taxes) as compared with the economics of religion's more traditional focus on finances and subsidies which, while crucial for religious organizations, hardly affect the people's sense of religious–cultural identity.

Our article contributes to the recent growth in scholarly interest in public attitudes toward immigrants in general and Muslim immigrants in particular (see Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014 for a recent review). Although a series of studies has sought to explain attitudes toward Muslims (e.g., Kalkan, Layman, & Uslaner, 2009; Saroglou, Lamkaddem, van Pachterbeke, & Buxant, 2009; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Stolz, 2005; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008; Van der Noll, 2010), they tend to focus on individual characteristics and refer to theories explaining resentment toward immigrants in general. Our article advances a more specific argument to understand opposition toward Muslim immigrants by stressing the religious–cultural nature of this political conflict (see also Helbling, 2012; Koopmans, 2013). By focusing on the political contexts of religious regulation, we go beyond studies that have investigated the effects of the economic or demographic contexts such as unemployment and immigration rates (Hopkins, 2010; Kunovich, 2004; McLaren, 2010; Meuleman, Davidov, & Billiet, 2009; Quillian, 1995; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008) as well as to more recent work on the role of political institutions or integration regimes (Weldon, 2006; Wright, 2011; Wright & Bloemraad, 2012). We show that, in general, religious regulation is a better predictor of citizens' anti-Muslim sentiment than the number of Muslim immigrants or integration policy.

This finding also suggests that recent re-evaluations of the public role of religion and its compatibility with democracy may have been too sanguine (Driessen, 2010). Even benevolent forms of religious regulation may have unintended consequences by shaping citizens' attitudes which are detrimental to liberal understandings of democracy. Our study, thus, complements the findings of cross-national studies on religious discrimination (Fox & Akbaba, 2013, 2014) that based on macro-data also relate state support of religion to higher levels of discrimination, by providing a potential micro-foundation and presenting new survey-based evidence for this link.

The consistency with the cross-national religious discrimination literature supports the generalizability of our results from a sub-national comparison of the Swiss cantons. Sub-national variation in state support of religion exists in several states facing the challenges of Muslim immigration. For

instance, the public law status of religious organizations and other forms of religious regulation differ across the 16 federal states of Germany. Public funding of religious education varies across the Canadian provinces and territories. Even in France, financial support of religion depends on regional specificities as is exemplified by the special status of Alsace-Loraine. We expect our results to directly speak to these and similar cases with sub-national variation in church–state relations. But given the fact that the extent of the sub-national variation we observe in Switzerland is comparable with cross-national variation in Western Europe (see below) and the fact that our results are in accordance with cross-national studies on religious discrimination, they may well be generalizable to cross-national settings and help us understand more broadly the institutional roots of citizens' attitudes toward Muslim immigrants.

Theory

Cultural Threat and the Explanation of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

The main explanation for anti-immigrant sentiments put forward in the literature is that immigrants are perceived as a competitive threat to the host society (Blalock, 1967; Blumer, 1958; Quillian, 1995).[1] The scholarly debate mainly revolves around the question whether this threat is best understood either in terms of economic resources or cultural identities, with a tendency to favor the latter (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Tingley, 2013). Whereas economic concerns subsume fears over increased labor market competition as well as strains on social security systems, cultural concerns evolve around issues of national identity, shared values, and social cohesion that may be threatened by immigrants. More recently, several scholars have developed more specific cultural threat arguments to explain negative attitudes toward Muslim immigrants to Europe whose traditional religiosity and cultural beliefs on gender roles or sexuality are often considered incompatible with the liberal and secular lifestyles in these countries (e.g., Helbling, 2014; Saroglou et al., 2009; Sniderman & Hagendoorn, 2007; Van der Noll, 2010).

Our theoretical argument builds and expands on these perspectives. Like others before us, we stress the fundamental role of cultural threat in our explanation for anti-Muslim attitudes. And like others, we also argue that Muslim immigrants' religious practices and claims for religious rights are the decisive features of this particular group that trigger the feelings of cultural threat in citizens of the host society. Where we depart from previous

explanations in the literature is in some of the basic assumptions concerning the host societies, the exact mechanisms we belief to be at work and, as a result, in the empirical predictions we derive. We place political institutions of religious regulation at the center of our theory and argue that these institutional contexts determine the extent to which Muslims' religious practices and claims for religious rights are perceived as threat and Muslim immigrants resented.

Up to now, the group threat hypothesis has been operationalized on the contextual level by relying on either demographic or economic characteristics of regions or nations, such as the inflow of immigrants or the general economic situation (e.g., Dancygier & Donnelly, 2014; Ha, 2010; Hopkins, 2010, 2011; McLaren, 2003; Schlueter & Davidov, 2013; Strabac, 2011; Manevska & Achterberg, 2013; Newman, 2013). With regard to genuinely political factors, some studies have looked at the effects of welfare state regimes on attitudes toward immigrants (Facchini & Mayda, 2009; Hanson, Scheve, & Slaughter, 2007; van Oorschot & Uunk, 2007), and more recently, researchers have started to explain attitudes toward immigrants by investigating the effects of citizenship and integration policies (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2011; Kesler & Bloemraad, 2010; Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009; Schlueter, Meuleman, & Davidov, 2013; Weldon, 2006; Wright, 2011; Wright & Bloemraad, 2012). Our study will also consider these alternative explanations by incorporating indicators of religious demography and general immigrant integration policies in our statistical models below. However, we will demonstrate that these alternative factors are only of limited use in accounting for the variation in anti-Muslim sentiments.

Institutions of Public Life and Collective Identities are Far From Secular

Existing research has only partly accounted for the specific challenges which arise from Muslim immigration and the related controversial political debates on the Muslim headscarf and religious buildings like mosques or minarets (Bowen, 2007; Joppke, 2009; Thomas, 2006). What makes Muslim immigration unique is that Western democracies must now deal with new religious customs and immigrants' claims for the accommodation of religious rights. These new religious claims must now "be accommodated within preexisting normative understandings and institutional arrangements of state–church relations that have crystallized in nationally specific ways from centuries of demarcation struggles between states and Christian churches" (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Koopmans, 2013, p. 165).

In our theory, we follow up on these theoretical intuitions by focusing on the political context of the regulation of religion. We argue that irrespective of changes in religious demography and general policy approaches to immigrant integration, it is the institutional arrangements of state support of religion, that is, the friendliness or identification of the state with a religious tradition (Durham, 1996), which shape the views citizens have toward Muslim immigration and the accommodation of the their religious rights. Political institutions define the rules of the game of public life and embody the shared cultural norms on which collective identities are built (Hall, 1986; Thelen & Steinmo, 1992). To understand under what institutional conditions Muslim immigration is perceived as threat, we need to better understand (a) the nature of these institutions, (b) how people in the receiving societies relate to them, and (c) how they are challenged by Muslim's claims for religious rights. From these theoretical building blocks, we will be able to derive clear predictions about the impact of state support of religion on citizens' attitudes toward Muslim immigration which contradict previous arguments in the literature (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Helbling, 2014; Koopmans, 2013).

We argue that, in general, the supposed "secularism" of European liberal democracy, both in terms of the rules of the game of public life and of collective identities, has been grossly overstated in the literature. Instead, we believe that the reason why Muslim religious practices threaten the collective identities in European host societies is precisely because the latter are deeply rooted in religious traditions. Recent empirical studies show that the institutional reality of European democracies is indeed far from "secular" and that quite to the contrary institutions of state support of religion are in fact well-developed, widespread, and an integral element of public life in most European societies (Driessen, 2010; Fox, 2006, 2008, 2013).

It is important to stress that we are *not* saying that European publics are "religious" in terms of active religious practice or beliefs. What we are saying is that collective identities and institutions of public life are intimately related to historical religious traditions and are now shared by citizens regardless of whether they consider themselves to be religious or not. In the words of Norris and Inglehart (2004), "although only 5% of the Swedish public attends church weekly, the Swedish public as a whole manifests a distinctive Protestant value system that they hold in common with citizens of other Protestant societies" (p. 17). Importantly, these collective identities "are not transmitted primarily by the church, but by the educational system and the mass media" (Norris & Inglehart, 2004, p. 17; see also Inglehart & Baker, 2000). These are important channels through which political socialization and democratic learning takes place (Almond & Verba, 1963) and through which people internalize the role that religious symbols and traditions play in

their society. Citizens' sense of collective identity is further reinforced through their repeated experience and contact with the institutions that structure considerable parts of public life.

Conceptualizing State–Church Relations as Degrees of Regulation

Understanding how citizens relate to institutions of religious regulation and thus the effects of state support of religion on citizens' attitudes, further requires that we move beyond crude legal typologies or abstract theoretic models and focus on what states actually do (Bader, 2007; Enyedi, 2003; Fox, 2008; Minkenberg, 2002; Traunmüller & Freitag, 2011). Contrary to common practice in political theory and qualitative case studies, church–state relations are not adequately captured by a mere dichotomy distinguishing one ideal type, for example, *established religion*, from another ideal type, for example, *separation of church and state*. Rather, they present a complex and multifaceted set of official laws, policies, and administrative actions that aim to regulate the activities of religious groups and individuals.

Viewing state–church relations in terms of religious regulation gives a more adequate description of empirical reality. An instructive case is France, which in scholarly and political debate usually serves as the ideal type of a laicist regime with a strict separation of religion and the state (e.g., Fetzer & Soper, 2005). In reality, however, state support of religion in France clearly exceeds what most would consider a strictly secularist policy as the state subsidizes religious schools, hospitals, and buildings (Fox, 2008; Kuru, 2009; Madeley, 2003). Ironically, France scores higher on measures of government favoritism and state funding of religion than the United Kingdom (Grim & Finke, 2006), which often serves as an ideal type for a state–church system. Indeed, de jure constitutional clauses and principles are largely unrelated to the de facto extent that governments identify with and support religion in practice (Fox & Flores, 2009) and therefore how religious tradition pervades the public life in a country and the everyday experience of its citizens.

How Accommodation Changes Religious Regulation and Shapes Citizens' Attitudes

Conceptualizing state support of religion in gradual terms as religious regulation not only captures the empirical complexity more adequately than do abstract legal categories and typologies. It also allows us to describe political contexts as a continuum in terms of the extent of regulation or the amount of



Figure 1. Illustration of the theoretical argument that the degree of institutional state support of religion determines the extent to which the accommodation of Muslims' religious rights is perceived as threat by citizens.
Changing religious rights for Muslim immigrants from the status quo to more accommodation leads to a greater decrease in state support for the majority in Context A (where state support is high) than in Context B (where state support is low). These differences in the decrease of state support correspond to differences in expected loss and perceived threat, and as a consequence, the rejection of Muslim immigrants and their religious practices.

state support. This lets us more readily connect religious policy with the consequences of Muslim immigration and the attitudes of the people living within these political contexts. As state support can now be conceived of in terms of more or less, changes in religious policy toward accommodation of religious minorities are readily expressed in terms of gains and losses. If we want to understand people's reaction to Muslim immigration, we must acknowledge that just as Muslim immigrants demand the right to live their religious traditions, members of the host society, too, value their existing institutions and cultural traditions. Changing existing rules to fit Muslim demands for religious rights to a considerable degree involves the changing of traditions that are an integral part of people's collective identity. To the citizens, it is perfectly rational to want to preserve them and to resist what they view as a loss.

Figure 1 illustrates how, according to our theory, the institutional status quo of state support of religion determines the extent to which Muslim immigrants' claims for religious accommodation are perceived as loss for citizens in host societies. It also lays open the key assumptions on which our argument rests: (a) State support of religion is conceived of as uni-dimensional continuum of unequal treatment of religious groups that results from government favoritism and identification with the majority religion and (b) the

accommodation of religious minority rights corresponds to reducing this unequal treatment. Changes in religious policy are therefore essentially perceived as zero-sum games, were the majority loses what the minority gains. Finally, we also assume (c) that feelings of threat and rejection of Muslim immigrants' claims are more or less proportional to the loss expected from accommodating their religious needs.

This simple theory allows to explain variations in anti-Muslim sentiment by referring to the institutional contexts in which citizens find themselves. Expanding religious rights for Muslim immigrants by leaving the status quo and moving toward the accommodation of Muslim claims means moving down the *y* axis of state support for the majority. The exact same religious claims by Muslims would lead to greater loss of privileges in Context A than in Context B and thus result in more rejection in Context A than in Context B. In fact, citizens in Condition A will always experience more loss than citizens in Condition B no matter what degree of religious equality is claimed by Muslim immigrants as, by assumption, accommodation in Context B will not move further up the *y* axis (i.e., Muslim seek to lower the unequal treatment by the state). Note that this assumption is compatible with the view of institutions of religious regulation as opportunity structures which define what claims can reasonably be made by new religious groups (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Koopmans & Statham, 1999).

Correcting and Expanding Predictions on the Relation Between Religious Regulation and Religious Minority Rights

Although we believe our theoretical argument to be straightforward, it both contradicts and expands existing views on the role of religious regulation for the accommodation of Muslim rights. Most notably, in an influential study on Muslims in Europe, Fetzer and Soper (2005) posited the exact reverse relationship between religious regulation and the accommodation of Muslim religious rights: "Some states have more easily accommodated these religious needs than others because they have well-developed relations between political and religious institutions" (p. 20). The reason for this competing prediction, they argue, is that the public of the receiving society is more amenable to claims for religious rights of minorities in institutional contexts that are friendly toward religion in general. Systems of strict separation of church and state, however, view new religious demands as illegitimate and thus produce intolerance toward Muslims' religious practices.

The few empirical studies which have followed this lead and looked at the effects of state–church regimes on individual attitudes reach inconclusive

results. We believe this is because they conceptualize state–church regime in reference to legal typologies instead of religious regulation and suffer from important data limitations as they rely only on an extremely small number of countries. For three countries, Fetzer and Soper (2005) looked at the impact of state–church regimes on attitudes toward Muslim religious practices without, however, finding any relationship. Van der Noll (2010) showed in her study on four Western European countries that attitudes are more negative in France with a (supposedly) clear separation between state and church than, for example, in Great Britain with its (supposed) state–church system. Ironically, this study delivers the right results but gives the wrong reasons. As we have briefly commented above, actual government favoritism is in fact higher in France than it is in Great Britain. According to our theory, we would expect France to be less tolerant than Great Britain—but not because the former is laicist and the latter has a state church, but because actual government favoritism for the majority religion is higher in France than in Great Britain. In his study with six Western European countries, Helbling (2014) found a similar effect when it comes to attitudes toward the Muslim headscarf. He found, however, no effect for general attitudes toward Muslim immigrants.

Challenging existing arguments in the literature, we predict that citizens are more likely to oppose Muslim immigration and the accommodation of Muslim religious rights in political contexts that are characterized by a strong identification of state and religious culture. This prediction is in line with cross-national studies on religious discrimination (Fox & Akbaba, 2013, 2014) and expands the arguments of the religious economy model by Grim and Finke (2007, 2011) who also argued that religious regulation leads to more social hostilities toward religious minorities. However, their argument focuses (a) on restrictive policies toward minority religion and (b) on the strategic behavior of religious organizations and elites. We show that even beneficial and well-intended policies of religious support for the religious majority may have unintended negative consequences for religious minorities. Moreover, we argue that religious regulation not only defines the opportunity structure for religious organizations but also directly affects the general public and shapes its attitudes toward religious minorities. These effects stem largely from policies that relate to the upholding of a collective identity and are highly visible to ordinary citizens (such as public religious symbols, religious holidays, religious education in public schools, or church taxes) as compared with the economics of religion's more traditional focus on finances and subsidies which, while crucial for religious organizations, hardly affect the people's sense of religious–cultural identity. In this sense, our argument provides a micro-foundation for cross-national studies which finds that states

that support the majority religion through religious legislation are more likely to engage in religious discrimination (Fox & Akbaba, 2013, 2014).

Two more specific propositions also follow from our theoretical argument. First, because our theory stresses the tangible nature of institutions of state support of religion, we expect *that the more visible cultural and symbolic aspects of state support of religion will be more harmful for religious tolerance than purely economic ones*. Although the latter aspects are without doubt important to religious organizations and religious elites, citizens in general are likely to be more concerned with religious symbols on flags and in public buildings, religious holidays, customs, and festivals as well as with what their children learn and eat in school. It is also these aspects where accommodation amounts to a zero-sum affair, for example, the removal of Christian symbols from public buildings, the rededication of religious holidays and festivals, or the banning of certain foods from school menus. Second, as we regard institutions of state support of religion to be part of the general collective identity within a polity, we expect that *more state support of religion will lead to less tolerant attitudes among all citizens, regardless of their actual religiosity in terms of religious involvement and beliefs*.

Data and Method

A Sub-National Comparison of the Swiss Case

So far, quantitative comparative studies have been hampered by the simple fact that large international surveys usually include no questions on issues related to Muslim immigrants and their religious practices. Our solution to this lack of cross-national comparative data is to turn to the sub-national comparative method (Snyder, 2001) and to investigate a federal state, where such survey data are available and where religious matters are regulated at the state level. At the same time, this will allow us to increase the number of cases and also to hold constant and, thus, eliminate potentially confounding factors in the explanation of attitudes toward Muslims.

Most importantly, it allows us to deal with a difficult problem in cross-national comparison and to hold constant the specific context of Muslim immigration, that is, the main countries of origin and ethnic background of Muslim immigrants, the social and historical conditions of Muslim immigration, and consequently the challenges to the integration and accommodation of this immigrant group. The vast majority of Muslims in Switzerland are descendants of migrant workers from the Balkans and from Turkey who came to Switzerland for purely economic reasons in the 1960s, followed by a wave of family reunion in the second half of the 1970s (Gianni, 2005).[2]

The initial labor immigration was considered a temporary phenomenon to counter the labor shortage. The political necessity to socially integrate this immigrant group and to accommodate their religious rights arose from the fact that, instead of returning to their countries of origin, these immigrants and their families decided to stay permanently and now live in Switzerland already in the second or third generation. This new situation puts issues of religious regulation and the accommodation of Muslim religious practices (notably not only in schools but also other public institutions) on the political agenda.

But investigating sub-national units is not simply a methodological fix or second-best solution. In fact, it may also be substantively more appropriate to study immigration issues at the sub-national than the national level. Although the nation-state has constituted the main unit of analyses for a long time, more recently, the sub-national level is considered the most relevant context, as this is the place where immigrants integrate and interact with natives (Caponio & Borkert, 2010; Penninx, Kraal, Martinello, & Vertovec, 2004).

Switzerland constitutes a good case for the study of the effects of different state–church regulations across a large number of settings because of its pronounced federalism and the large degrees of autonomy afforded to the 26 Swiss cantons (Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008). Although there are minimal regulations at the federal level, it is the cantons that are primarily entitled to regulate religious matters (Hafner & Gremmelspacher, 2005). Despite the fact that in all cantons, Christian churches (and in some instances Jewish communities) are publicly recognized, we observe a large range of regulations, comparable with the variation we observe across Western European countries (see below). In some French-speaking cantons, for instance, Christian churches are organized as private associations and do not constitute public legal bodies which resemble the laicist model in France. In other cantons, the churches are best described as state churches comparable with the situation in many Scandinavian countries (Hafner & Gremmelspacher, 2005). In between, religious regulations such as religious education in school, collections of church taxes, or financial support vary considerably across cantons.

Measuring State Support of Religion

The central explanatory variable of our analysis, *state support of religion*, comprises a tangled mix of different regulations as well as direct and indirect forms of payment and subsidies. To operationalize this dimension of religious regulation, we draw on data for the 26 Swiss Cantons. The data are based on the coding scheme of the second round of the RAS (Fox, 2008, 2011). The RAS indices are currently the most comprehensive and

convincing measures of government regulation of religion (Traunmüller, 2012), and the new data set provides these measures for the Swiss sub-national level for the period 2003-2011.

The Religious Support Index consists of a total of 51 binary items that cover various privileges as well as legal and material support afforded to organized religion by the government (Fox, 2011). As this measurement instrument was designed to capture religious policy on a global scale, it includes state practices that range from church taxes and funding of religious organizations to the actual implementation of religious precepts, such as dietary laws, restrictions on sexual behavior, and forms of criminal punishment. However, in the case of the Swiss cantons in 2011, empirically, we only observe 17 of those different religious policies included in this index as a large number of the items concern particular aspects that are of relevance only outside the Western world (see Table 1 in the online appendix).

Out of these 17 items, six policies are in place in all of the cantons, namely, blasphemy laws protecting the majority as well as minority religions, mandatory closing of business during religious holidays, free air time for religious organizations on television or radio, the presence of an official department for religious affairs, and the listing of religious identity on government documents. Two, further, very common forms of state support of religion are religious education in public schools and the funding of religious buildings which we observe in no less than 24 of the 26 Swiss cantons. In 16 cantons, the government also collects church taxes. There is considerable sub-national variation in other forms of financial support of religion, that is, the funding of religious education in colleges or universities (nine cantons) as well as religious primary or secondary schools (six), salaries of clergy (eight), financial support of religious charitable organizations including hospitals (seven), and "other" funding (eight). The canton of Valais further provides direct grants to religious organizations. Finally, six cantons place additional restrictions on activities during religious holidays (so-called "blue laws") and exhibit religious symbols on their flags, respectively.

Following Fox (2008, 2011), we form the Religious Support Index by combining all items in an additive index without weighting. But to be sure, we will extensively discuss potential validity issues concerning this index in the Robustness and Further Analyses section. As the sub-national institutions of state support of religion have remained extremely stable between 2003 and 2011, we rely on the 2011 scores (the year of the survey) in our analyses. Across the 26 cantons, the Religious Support Index ranges from scores between 8 (Geneva) and 14 (Appenzell-Innerrhoden and Obwalden; see Figure 2 for an illustration of the sub-national variation). As a reference and to put this range in a broader context, we should note that the empirical



Figure 2. State support of religion in the 26 Swiss cantons 2011.

variation among European democracies (i.e., EU27 plus Iceland and Norway) is between 5 (Austria, Netherlands, Latvia) and 18 points (Iceland) and thus somewhat larger. Still, in terms of index scores, our sub-national comparison of the Swiss cantons is roughly like comparing disparate nations such as France and Luxembourg (8) with Spain, Sweden, and Poland (13) or with Germany and Greece (15).[3]

Measuring Individual Attitudes Toward Muslims

To measure attitudes toward Muslims, we use survey data from the 2011 wave of the SELECTS (Lutz, 2012). This survey included items on attitudes toward Muslims, the Muslim headscarf, and minarets that we will use as dependent variables (see Table 2 in the online appendix). So far, most studies have looked at attitudes toward either Muslims, religious practices such as wearing the headscarf, or Islamic schools (for Switzerland, see Christmann, Danaci, & Krömler, 2011; Hirter & Vatter, 2010; Stolz, 2005; Vatter, Milic, & Hirter, 2011). We believe that we need to investigate both aspects at the same time because controversies over Muslim immigration focus not only on the group itself but explicitly on their religious practices and symbols.

The original survey sample consisted of 4,391 respondents who are nested in 26 cantons and participated in a telephone survey (computer assisted telephone interview [CATI]). Small cantons were over-sampled to ensure that there are at least 100 respondents in each canton. The survey took place over

the period of 3 weeks after the national elections in October/November 2011. Out of this first survey, 2,489 respondents agreed to fill in a paper questionnaire with additional questions. We will use the reduced sample as two of our three dependent variables have been included in the paper questionnaire. Detailed analyses with the immigration items that have been included in the full sample have shown that the reduced and full samples lead to the same results.

Respondents have been asked whether there are too many Muslim immigrants in Switzerland; whether in Switzerland, Muslim women should have the right to wear a religious headscarf in public; and whether in Switzerland, Muslims should have the right to construct minarets. For each question, respondents could choose between the following five answer categories: fully agree, partly agree, neither/nor, partly disagree, and fully disagree. See Table 2 in the online appendix for exact question wordings.

Figure 3 gives a first descriptive impression of attitudes toward Muslims across the whole of Switzerland. Almost a quarter (24%) of all Swiss agree with the statement that "there are too many Muslims in Switzerland," 12% even "totally." Although the majority (57%) does not share this view, and a further fifth (20%) is undecided on this issue, it is nonetheless a considerable part of the population that holds reservations toward Muslims. Interestingly, the attitudes toward the religious rights of Muslims are more polarized with more respondents taking sides and fewer neutral answers. Although the right of Muslim women to wear their headscarves in public is again supported by a majority of almost 57% of all Swiss, more than a third (35%) oppose it. This makes the headscarf a slightly more contentious issue than the right to construct minarets which finds support from almost two thirds (61%) and is opposed by 30% of the Swiss population. Again, these numbers clearly indicate a rejection of Muslims that is widely held in Swiss society. However, there is also considerable sub-national variation in attitudes toward Muslims and their religious practices.

Controls

At the contextual level, we take into account alternative explanations and control for the percentage of Muslims in the population and the general integration regime. The latter allows us to replicate earlier studies which primarily looked at the effect of integration policies and to compare the strengths of the integration regulations with the more specific regulations of religious issues. To measure integration regimes, we use a cantonal policy index developed by Manatschal (2011) that covers the years 2004 to 2008. This index includes some of the items of the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX;



Figure 3. Attitudes toward Muslims in Switzerland.
Own calculation based on SELECTS 2011. Error bars refer to plus/minus one standard error.
SELECTS = Swiss Electoral Studies.

Huddleston & Niessen, 2011) and the Indices of Citizenship Rights for Migrants (ICRI; Koopmans, Michalowski, & Waibel, 2012; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passy, 2005). Similar to our index on government regulation of religion, we thus use an index that has been used so far to compare national regulations to study cantonal policies. Adapted to the Swiss context, the index by Manatschal (2011) measures civic-political, socio-structural, and cultural/religious rights of immigrants as well as requirements for family reunification and anti-discrimination regulations.[4] As Manatschal and Stadelmann-Steffen (2013) showed, the policy variation at the cantonal level is substantial and comparable with the variation across Western European countries.[5]

On the individual level, we include socio-demographics such as gender, age, and education along with measures of left–right ideology, closeness to the conservative/right wing Swiss People's Party (SVP), urban versus rural living area, as well as church attendance and religious denomination (none, Protestant, Catholic, Other). We therefore control for the most relevant confounding variables in the xenophobia and Islamophobia literature (Fetzer, 2000; Helbling, 2012; Stolz, 2005; Vatter et al., 2011). See Table 2 in the online appendix for question wordings and coding details and Table 3 for summary statistics of all variables.

Potential Threats to Inference

The goal of our analysis is to demonstrate that there is a clear empirical correspondence between what citizens think about Muslim immigrants and their religious practices on one hand and the political contexts in which they live on the other. However, we are under no illusion that our research design has obvious limitations with regard to causal identification—a fate we share with most comparative politics scholars interested in the effects of institutions on political outcomes (Pzreworski, 2009; Rodden, 2009). As we cannot randomly assign citizens to political contexts, all we are left with is a discussion of potential threats to inference and the assumptions we make.

First, we seek to get a handle on potential confounding by controlling for all available cultural, economic, and political variables we could think of that could be associated with both state support of religion and anti-Muslim sentiment. This is done in the Robustness and Further Analyses section. Second, we believe we can rule out self-selection effects where citizens pre-disposed to religious intolerance would seek to live in certain cantons but not others. Although such processes are plausible within cantons—say in the choice of rural versus urban living area or particular neighborhoods—we find it unlikely that citizens self-select into larger sub-national regions based on their views toward Muslims. Third, and most problematic in our view, it is clear that institutions are endogenous and always the result of policy processes that take into account the opinions of the citizens. Although we have no solution to this problem given the nature of the data available to us, we have already seen above that sub-national state support of religion has been extremely stable over the decade preceding the time of our analysis. As institutions evolve slowly, we would argue that this institutional status quo is the result of earlier political conflicts and is hardly affected by current debates over Muslim immigration. Although we are aware of these limitations, given



Figure 4. Posterior means and 90% HPDs of three Bayesian hierarchical-ordered probit models.
The item "Too many Muslims" has been reversed so that all dependent variables refer to positive attitudes toward Muslims. Reference category for religious denomination is "None." All variables, except for dummies, have been standardized by two standard deviations. Based on un-informative priors and 2,000 MCMC iterations. See Table 4 in the online appendix for full numerical results. HPDs = highest posterior densities; SVP = Swiss People's Party; MCMC = Markov Chain Monte Carlo.

the current state of the debate, we still find the results presented in the following section highly suggestive and worthy of discussion.

Results

To accommodate the hierarchical structure of our data as well as the ordinal scale of our attitudinal measures, in Figure 4, we estimate hierarchical-ordered probit models (Gelman & Hill, 2007). We start our analyses with simple varying intercept specifications that relate a canton's level of state support of religion to respondent's attitudes toward Muslim while controlling for variables at the individual and cantonal level. We run separate models of this form for each of the attitudinal items[6] and estimate them in a Bayesian framework.[7] To aid the comparison of coefficients, we standardized them by two standard deviations (except for dummies; Gelman & Hill, 2007) and present them in graphs instead of tables (Kastellec & Leoni, 2007). We report posterior means and 90% highest probability density (HPD) regions, the

Bayesian equivalent to regressions coefficients and confidence intervals. Full tables with results can be found in the online appendix.

Turning to the individual characteristics, first, we find that they behave similarly across the three survey items. The most important predictor for attitudes toward Muslims is political ideology in terms of the left–right scale. It is clearly negative and bounded away from zero. People who lean to the right are more likely to agree that there are too many Muslims in Switzerland (posterior mean of −0.89 and 90% HPD [−1.00, −0.76]), and less likely to agree that they should have the right to wear headscarves (−0.75 [−0.87, −0.63]) or to build minarets (−1.16 [−1.29, −1.01]). The same pattern applies to respondents who feel close to the SVP, although the negative effects are somewhat weaker (too many Muslims: −0.61 [−0.78, −0.45], headscarf: −0.38 [−0.54, −0.23], minarets: −0.75 [−0.93, −0.56]). Higher education is related to more positive evaluations of the presence and rights of Muslims (too many Muslims: 0.55 [0.44, 0.66], headscarf: 0.38 [0.27, 0.50], minarets: 0.57 [0.46, 0.68]). Respondents from urban areas have more favorable attitudes toward Muslim immigration (0.12 [0.00, 0.25]) and the right to build minarets (0.19 [0.05, 0.32]) but do not differ from respondents living in rural areas with regard to their attitude toward the Muslim headscarf. Interestingly, individual religiosity and religious belonging is not associated with attitudes toward Muslims in statistical reliable ways. Although older respondents tend to agree that there are too many Muslims in the country (−0.39 [−0.51, −0.28]), they do not differ from the younger generations with regard to views on the rights this religious minority should enjoy. Men and women generally do not differ in their attitudes toward Muslims.

With regard to contextual characteristics at the level of the Swiss cantons, we find that the share of the Muslim population in the canton stands in a mixed relation to citizens' attitudes. Although it is related to the view that there are too many Muslims in the country (−0.13 [−0.25, 0.00], it is also the case that higher the share of Muslims in the canton are related to a friendlier attitude toward the headscarf (0.26 [0.14, 0.37]). However, we do not find a statistical reliable effect for Muslims' rights to build minarets. Compared with this demographic factor, what role do political institutions play? The general cantonal integration regime is only related to the population's evaluation of the wearing of the headscarf, where more open and liberal regimes tend to produce more critical evaluations (−0.13 [−0.25, −0.01]). With regard to the views regarding the number of Muslims in Switzerland and Muslims' rights to build minarets, we found no reliable differences between integration regimes (although for the latter it is a close call). These are notable findings, given the emphasis the literature puts on religious demography and general immigration and integration regimes.



Figure 5. Predicted probabilities (along with 90% HPDs) of agreeing "somewhat" or "totally" with the survey items, depending on the scores of the Religious Support Index.

Based on the Bayesian hierarchical-ordered probit models reported in Table 4 in the online appendix. All continuous explanatory variables are fixed at their means and the dummies refer to being female, not feeling close to the SVP, urban living area, and being Catholic. The little gray strips at the bottom show the empirical distribution of religious support across the cantons (slightly jittered). HPDs = highest posterior densities; MCMC = Markov Chain Monte Carlo; SVP = Swiss People's Party.

More important than religious demography and the general integration policy in a canton are the prevalent institutions of religious regulation and in particular the support of religion by the government. Higher scores on the Religious Support Index are associated with the feeling that the number of Muslims is too high (−0.24 [−0.37, −0.10]). And, although the HPD of state support of religion just includes the null for the respondents' attitudes toward the headscarf (−0.09 [−0.21, 0.03]),[8] people in cantons with supportive religious regulation of the majority religion tend to hold more restrictive views on the Muslims' right to build minarets (−0.15 [−0.28, −0.01]).

As coefficients of ordered probit models are hard to interpret in substantive terms, we plot predicted probabilities (along with 90% HPDs) of agreeing "somewhat" or "totally" with the survey items, depending on the scores of the Religious Support Index in Figure 5. All other continuous explanatory variables are fixed at their means and the dummies refer to being female and

Catholic, but not feeling close to the SVP. Contrasting the observed minimum index score of 8 with the maximum of 14 reduces the positive evaluation of number of Muslims in the canton from 32% (90% HPD [27, 38]) to a mere 19% [13, 25]. This is less than two thirds and, therefore, evidence of a substantial institutional effect. For attitudes toward Muslim women's right to wear a headscarf, the respective difference is only around 6 points on the probability scale and not statistically reliable. With regard to the right to build minarets, we find a difference of 9 points, from 36% [31, 41] to 27% [20, 34]. Again, this is an effect of considerable size. What citizens think about Muslim immigration and the accommodation of Muslim religious rights is clearly and powerfully related to the institutional status quo in which they find themselves.

Robustness and Further Analyses

Needless to say, these findings need further checking. Concerns regarding the robustness of our results are most likely related to the operationalization of our key explanatory variable, further potentially confounding factors, and sensitivity to influential outliers. Also, it is conceivable that there is effect heterogeneity, that is, that religious policy affects subgroups in the population only. We address all of these concerns in turn.

Validity of the Religious Support Index

A first point of criticism that frequently surfaces in discussion is directed at the validity of the index we use as key explanatory variable. As the Religious Support Index adds up a variety of different items, it could be questionable whether it adequately captures the theoretical concept of interest and gives enough weight to truly relevant aspects of supportive religious regulation or, conversely, gives too much weight to irrelevant ones. Unfortunately, the literature provides little guidance in this matter and there is "a relatively catastrophic failure of experts to agree" on what those truly relevant items may be (Fox, 2011, p. 32). We therefore test the robustness of our results by rerunning all our models 100 more times, randomly varying the weighting scheme of the index each time and recording the change in coefficients size and uncertainty (see Figure 5 in the online appendix). This random weighting scheme is informed by and thus reflects the variation in expert opinion.[9] However, our test shows that the substantial finding on the role of state support of religion for citizens' attitudes toward Muslims does not depend on any specific weighting and/or conceptualization of supportive religious regulation.

As a further test and to get a better understanding about which particular religious policies are responsible for the effects of state support of religion on attitudes toward Muslims, we ran additional models that included single items of the Religious Support Index separately in the equations (see Figure 6 in the online appendix).[10] Out of the 11 religious policies that varied over the cantons, only four seem to really drive the results and influence citizens' attitudes regarding Muslims and their rights. First, where regional laws place restrictions on certain activities during religious holidays, citizens believe that there are too many Muslims in the country (−0.24 [−0.39, −0.07]) and tend to oppose Muslims' right to construct minarets with a posterior probability of 89% (−0.11 [−0.26, 0.04]). Second, the same influence on public opinion arises from systems of church taxes. Where the government collects taxes on behalf of religious organizations, people are more likely to say there are too many Muslims (−0.20 [−0.35, −0.05]) and that they should not be allowed to build minarets (−0.16 [−0.28, −0.03]). Third, with a posterior probability of 94%, religious education in public schools is related to the regional share of people who think there are too many Muslims in the country (−0.30 [−0.60, 0.02]). Finally, with a posterior probability of 93%, citizens of cantons with religious symbols on their flag are more likely to oppose the right to build minarets (−0.14 [−0.30, 0.02]). Interestingly, we see no reliable coefficients for the various items referring to the financial support of religious organizations.[11]

In other words, institutional effects on citizens' attitudes toward Muslims stem from mostly cultural aspects of religious regulation that relate to the upholding of a collective identity (flag, religious holidays, and religious education in public school) and/or that are highly visible to the general public (such as church taxes). In contrast, the many intricacies of church funding are probably not known to large parts of the population. Although they may well define crucial opportunity structures for religious organizations and actors, they do not affect the people's sense of religious–cultural identity and, thus, their views of the Muslim minority.

Alternative Explanatory Factors

A further concern that could be raised regards explanatory factors that have not been included in the original model specification but potentially affect both state support of religion and attitudes toward Muslims. Figure 7 in the online appendix, therefore, presents the coefficients of the Religious Support Index when we additionally control for further structural, cultural, and economic factors discussed in the relevant literature, along with the coefficients for these control variables. In particular, we consider the increase in the

regional share of Muslims between 1990 and 2010, the share of Catholics in the canton, the language region, vote share for the SVP as well as regional unemployment rates, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, economic inequality, and the degree or urbanization (see Figure 7 in the online appendix). All of the results remain robust. An exception could be the model explaining attitudes toward Muslims' right to build minarets, where once we control for inequality, the posterior intervals just include the null (−0.13 [−0.28, 0.01]). But the posterior probability of a negative effect of state support of religion is still 93%. This hardly jeopardizes the general findings. Quite to the contrary, we now even find reliable coefficients for the effect state support of religion on attitudes toward Muslim women's right to wear the headscarf in public (−0.13 [−0.26, .01]; posterior probability <0: 94%). In addition, if we control for the increase in regional Muslim population 1990-2010 or for the share of Catholics in the canton, supportive religious regulation is related to more negative attitudes to the headscarf (−0.13 [−0.25, 0.01], posterior probability <0: 94%, and −0.20 [−0.34, −0.05], respectively). These findings further strengthen our theoretical argument and add to the empirical evidence presented in the main models.

Potentially Influential Outliers

As with 26 Swiss cantons, we are dealing with a relatively small number of contextual units only; single cases can quickly exert a large influence on our results. In each of the three model equations, we therefore checked for potentially influential outliers, relying on a multilevel equivalent of Cook's $D > 4 / J$ as a criterion, where J is the number of cantons (Van der Meer, Te Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 2010). However, only the canton of Zurich had a critical value in the "right to build minarets" model (Cook's D of 0.22). Excluding this observation from the model does not alter our results in any substantial way, and the coefficient for the Religious Support Index remains virtually unchanged (−0.15 [−0.27, −0.01]).

Effect Heterogeneity: Cross-Level Interactions

As a final test, we explore the possibility that supportive religious policies have different impacts on different groups in the population. In particular, it is conceivable that religious people react differently to the institutional context of religious regulation than the secular and that there is some effect variation across religious denominations. To accommodate this theoretical idea, we expand our model to a *varying intercept varying slope* specification by allowing the coefficient for individual religiosity (i.e., church attendance and

religious denomination) to vary over cantons and modeling it with the Religious Support Index. Interestingly, we find that state support of religion does not affect the attitudes of religious people more or less than of seculars (see Figure 8 in the online appendix). This holds for all three survey items and for both the attendance measure and the religious denomination dummies. In general, there seems to be a broad overarching consensus among the religious and the secular as well as across denominations when it comes to attitudes toward Muslims and their rights.

Conclusion

Political conflicts over Muslim immigration, the religious rights of this minority group, and the public display of their religious symbols have advanced to central challenges in almost all West European democracies (Bader, 2007; Minkenberg, 2008; Monsma & Soper, 2009). The 2009 Swiss ban of the minarets is one of the most striking examples of this recent development and clearly illustrates the crucial role of public attitudes in the accommodation of Islam in Europe. Understanding citizens' fears of Muslim immigration, their dislike for Muslim religious practices, and their opposition to Muslim religious rights is, therefore, essential for our understanding of the democratic challenges in Europe, the quality of modern immigration societies, and the role of religion in liberal democracy more generally.

We have proposed a new explanation by looking at the political context of this new religious intolerance and sought to demonstrate that the institutional status quo of religious regulation plays an important role in shaping citizens' views on Muslim immigration and the accommodation of Muslim religious rights. The empirical results broadly support our argument and contradict previous ones in the literature (Fetzer & Soper, 2005; Helbling, 2014; Koopmans, 2013). Analyzing the effects of religious regulation at the subnational level in Switzerland allowed us for the first time to compare a relatively large number of political contexts and to get closer to where immigration issues actually matter. We have seen that when the political, social, and cultural life of a canton is defined by strong references to religious tradition, citizens perceive Muslim immigrants as a threat to their way of life and react with animosity to their practices and demands.

These findings contribute to several debates in the literature. Following recent work on attitudes toward immigration, our article emphasizes the role of political institutions next to and above demographic or economic factors (e.g., Schlueter et al., 2013; Wright, 2011). At the same time, it underlines how important it is to develop more specific arguments to understand hostile

attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. On one hand, Muslims can be considered as just another immigrant group. Various studies have shown that some of the classic explanatory factors help us understand why they are resented. On the other hand, however, the religious claims of this particular immigrant group pose completely new challenges for Western democracies. Muslims are also considered a religious–cultural threat in societies that are far from secular and whose public institutions and collective identities are intimately related to historical religious traditions. Accordingly, the way religion is regulated is more important in the explanation of attitudes toward Muslims than integration regimes.

More generally, the argument proposed in this article allows us to connect the study of immigration to the study of religion. Our finding is in line with cross-national studies on religious discrimination (Fox & Akbaba, 2013, 2014) and extends the results of the economy of religion model by Grim and Finke (2007, 2011) who, like us, argued that religious regulation leads to more social hostilities toward religious minorities. Although they focus on the effects of restrictive religious policies, we show that even more benevolent religious regulation may affect negatively on the way religious minorities are viewed and treated. This is consistent with the religious discrimination literature and we confirm this finding with survey data from a single country. Interestingly, this occurs through more diffuse cultural mechanisms. Although we found no effects of financial or material support for religious organizations or actors which could structure their incentives to harm religious minorities, it is the cultural aspects of religious regulation which relate to the traditional collective identity and are highly visible to the general public that shape attitudes toward Muslims.

Finally, our results have important implications for the renewed debate on the role of religion in modern democracies. Although it was long believed that democracy presupposes a separation of religion and the state, a recent wave of studies has called this liberal notion into question by showing that not only is strict separation virtually absent in Western democracies except the United States (Fox, 2006, 2008) but that supportive religious regulation in terms of the identification with majority religion may be irrelevant if not even beneficial to levels of democracy (Driessen, 2010). Our results contradict this view and suggest that it may have been too optimistic as even benevolent forms of religious regulation may have unintended negative consequences for democracy. This detrimental effect on democracy runs via the attitudes of citizens. Where states support majority religions such important democratic values as religious tolerance, liberty, and equal treatment may suffer which in the end harms liberal democracy.

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Notes

1. An alternative explanation for attitudes toward immigrants is based on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981, 1982).
2. In addition, a smaller and more recent group of Muslim immigrants are political refugees and asylum seekers from former Yugoslavia, the Middle East, and North Africa (Gianni, 2005).
3. These figures are based on our own coding for the year 2011 based on the Religion and State Project 2 (RAS2) scheme designed by Fox (2008, 2011). Fox provides numbers up to the year 2008. Using his data, the empirical range of Religious Support Index in European countries is from 3 (Estonia) to 13 (Czech Republic and Greece). Translated to the national level, our comparison would roughly amount to comparing societies such as Belgium or Poland (8) with Czech Republic or Greece.
4. The following items are measured: political and voting rights, cantonal provisions of immigrants' commission, access to nationality (residence length and costs), integration requirements for naturalization and implementation thereof, access to employment in cantonal administration, dispositions toward Islamic burials, recognition of minorities religions, housing requirements for family reunification, and anti-discrimination regulations.
5. According to Manatschal (2012), there were hardly any policy changes between 2004 and 2008. Moreover, we are not aware of any major reforms between 2008 and 2011 (date of survey).

6. We opted for a separate analysis of the three survey items to gain more detailed insights. However, combining the items to a common scale using an item response theory (IRT) model leads to the same substantive conclusions.
7. We rely on the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) simulation algorithms implemented in the R package MCMC Generalised Linear Mixed Models (MCMCglmm; Hadfield, 2010). A fully Bayesian analysis requires the specification of priors for all unknown parameters. We used non-informative normal priors $\sim N(0, 10^8)$ for the fixed effect parameters and inverse Wishart priors $\sim W^{-1}(1, 0.002)$ for the variance component. For each model, one chain of the simulation algorithm was run for 250,000 iterations, where the first 150,000 simulations were discarded as "burn-in." The remaining iterations were thinned by a factor of 50, leaving 2,000 MCMC simulations for inference. Inspection of graphical diagnostics as well as formal convergence tests shows no signs of non-convergence (see Gill, 2008 for more details on MCMC diagnostics). Posterior coefficient estimates were rescaled by dividing by $\sqrt{2}$ and the variance component by dividing by 2 (Hadfield, 2012).
8. The posterior probability that the coefficient of state support is smaller than zero (i.e., that there is a negative effect) is still around 88%.
9. To let actual expert opinion guide the random weighting, we draw on the results in Fox (2011), who reports the judgments of 17 experts in the field. Each expert was asked to rate all of the items included in the index according to their importance for the connection between religion and politics as well as their significance in influencing people's lives. From these expert evaluations, we are able to calculate the probability that any one item is judged as being highly important or as unimportant. Based on these probabilities, we then randomly assigned a weighting factor of 2 to important and of 0 to unimportant items and repeated this procedure 100 times.
10. Of course, with so many tests, it could be that results turn out by pure chance, without anything substantial going on. But the consistency by which items matter across the models suggests that this is rather unlikely.
11. One exception could be the funding of religious schools which is related to less acceptance of the right to wear a headscarf with a posterior probability of 76% (−0.13 [−0.29, 0.03]).

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